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LOCATING AUTHORITY IN LAW, 










I.  Introduction:  The Self-Knowledge that Is Necessary for Law and for Authority 
 What is the locus of authority in what we do in the name of law?  This question, it should 
be apparent, is both circumscribed and expansive.  From the angle of circumscription, the 
question postulates (1) “authority” (2) as an isolable element (3) in a practice in which (4) “we” 
are engaged (5) “in the name of law.”  The angle that highlights the “we” forebodes the 
expansion.  After all, in order to locate authority’s place in what we do in the name of law, we 
must say who “we” are.  What could be easier -- or less possible?  “‘Know thyself’ we hear 
suggested for our own good.  Yet we hardly know ourselves.”
2  
 
                                                 
1
   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  B.A. 
(philosophy), Yale College; M.A. (philosophy), University of Toronto; J.D., Boalt Hall, U.C. Berkeley; clerk to 
Hon. John T. Noonan, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  For comments on drafts of this article, I am 
grateful to Joseph Vining, Richard Garnett, Steven Smith, Penny Pether, and Jack Coons.  An earlier version of this 
article appears as chapter nine in Patrick McKinley Brennan (ed.), Civilizing Authority: Society, State, and Church 
(2007). 
2
 Joseph Vining, From Newton’s Sleep (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 344. 
 2 
 Our resistance to self-knowledge has no doubt many causes, but among the legally 
orthodox, the asymptotic elimination of the human subject is virtually axiomatic.  The orthodox 
would vouchsafe law’s objectivity exactly by denying or minifying the subject’s appearance in 
our legal undertakings.  As one critic of the orthodoxy explains:   
Sometimes it seems as if there is only one story in American legal thought and only one 
problem.  The story is the story of formalism and the problem is the problem of the 
subject.  The story of formalism is that it never deals with the problem of the subject.  
The problem of the subject is that it’s never been part of the story.
3 
 
The heterodoxy I wish to develop and defend here takes the human subject as (proximate) 
starting point -- the font of law and authority to live by.
4
 
This competing theory observes that both the possibility and exigence of law -- and the 
authority that alone makes law possible -- issue from our subjectivity.  Force and violence reach 
us from without, and they do so arbitrarily and with no regard for who we are.  We become 
lawful, however, from the inside out, if we choose to do so at all.  This is because -- or, so I shall 
argue -- we subjects are normatively oriented, though not determined, to the real and the good.  
We humans are not mere objects, nor does the normative order arrest us from without in episodes 
of ‘now for something totally different.’  But before we advert to or thematize the fact, the fact is 
that we are ordered out of ourselves, first, to discover what is (the real) and, second, to discover 
and then realize the valuable that might yet be (the good).  Because this normativity is 
indefeasibly ours (as long as our rational capacities shall last), all additional or subsequent 
normative claims -- including those made ‘in the name of the law’ -- must meet its anterior and 
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 3 
concomitant demands.  Which is why we can say, with Joseph Vining: “The question what the 
law ‘is’ is not so very different from the question who we ‘are.’”
5  
 
 The jurisprudential mandarins who keep orthodoxy afloat are at pains to keep this a 
secret.  Ronald Dworkin’s signal defection from humanity to Hercules is only the limit case; 
most mainstream legal theorists are content to prosecute the more modest quest for the rule of 
law that is as much as possible not a rule of men.  We are all legal realists now, of course; “no 
adult needs to be told that we live under a rule of men in the sense that laws are made, 
interpreted, and administered by real men and women.”
6 
 However, at least from the moment the 
eager first Realists spotted the camel in the vicinity of the tent of law, those concerned for law’s 
rule have been trying to reconstruct law by constructing theories of how proto-realists can be 
made lawful.
7 
 Robert Bork’s originalism, Justice Scalia’s textualism, Bruce Ackerman’s 
dualism, Owen Fiss’s disciplining rules, Ronald Dworkin’s integrity
8
 -- from the right and from 
the left they come bearing theoretical gifts designed to ensure law’s rule in this world brought to 
us by Charles Darwin and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  This is the world in which the idea that 
there is a norm that precedes what we do in the name of the law -- a norm to which we are 
obligated freely to conform our living and the ‘positive law’ by which we structure and govern it 
-- has to compete with the idea that the only ‘laws’ are those of physics.     
 Some students of law oppose the embarrassing surfeit of theoretical riches by denying 
that the game is worth the candle; the aspiration to a rule of law, they say, is simply misplaced, a 
holdover from pre-lapsarian naivete.  Paul Kahn, for instance, in a very profound study of what 
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 4 
we do in the name of the law, concludes that “the rule of law may be our deepest political myth” 
and recommends -- citing the authority of Abraham Lincoln -- that in place of law, we appeal 
first to charity.
9 
 Others counter the grand theories with more modest, more prosaic, more 
“pragmatic” aims and means.  Judge Posner proposes legal pragmatism simpliciter, and Cass 
Sunstein, to pick another example, advocates “incompletely theorized agreements.”
10 
  
 This is all very interesting, to be sure -- but the trouble, as I see it, is that the ‘grand 
theory vs. muddling through’ false dilemma has largely blocked the human subject from view, 
and, along with him or her, the very possibility of authority and, therefore, of law.  The result of 
this theory-driven occlusion of the potentially-lawful subject is that what is put forward as law 
cannot but look “largely irrelevant to the self,”
11 
no better than “an unintelligible restraint.”
12 
 
What we adults do “need to be told” – or, rather, what we need to discover for ourselves -- is 
what it is in us that generates authority and thus makes law possible, thereby preempting or 
displacing the authoritarian and the arbitrary.  The availability of the authoritarian and of the 
arbitrary we can take for granted, but the possibility of law and of authority needs to be made out 
afresh, and this requires -- or, so I am arguing -- that we get to know ourselves.   
 What we do in the name of law has its externalia such as courthouses and capitols, codes 
and codicils, robes and ritual action, and these import ‘authority’ of a sort.  Furthermore, for 
reasons to which we shall come, we cannot do without externalia in law and the ‘authority’ 
associated with them.  But whereas no one mistakes robes and courthouses for the law itself, 
some do mistake texts for the law itself, thereby dissolving the possibility of genuine authority 
into one of its frequent fruits.  Texts, like other artifacts of our creation, are not self-moving, self-
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 5 
justifying marionettes of law; texts do not rise of themselves to wield authority over us.  A book 
of black marks the cover of which is embossed “Revised Statutes of the State of Utopia” or 
“Restatement (Seventh) of Everything” is an unlikely contributor to law; but if on the cover were 
etched “California” instead of “Utopia” or “Contracts” instead of “Everything,” we might -- or 
we might not -- have a different case, as anyone familiar with ‘unconstitutional’ statutes and the 
‘persuasive authority’ of a Restatement knows.  In figuring out what might make the difference 
in the latter case, what I am after is what in us is the root of law and of authority -- in a phrase, 
the inner experience of law.
13
   
 On the account I shall develop, ‘the inner experience of law’ includes the cognitional and 
volitional experiences of the legislator promulgating texts, of the judge interpreting these texts, 
and of the sheriff determining how to give coercive effect to judicial decisions bearing on the 
community; it also includes the experience of individual subjects understanding those rules and 
then receiving or rejecting them as guides to conduct.  Underneath and uniting all these (and 
other) particular inner experiences of law, however, there is the primordial inner experience of 
law; anteceding all particular experiences of law, it is the condition of their possibility.  I shall 
refer to it as the experience of inner law, what I referred to above as our normative orientation 
out of our interiority toward the real and the valuable.  ‘Inner law’ is my name for what Bernard 
Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984), referred to as the criterion that precedes “the criteria of truth 
invented by the philosophers:”
14 
 it is “the dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in 
intelligence itself.”  Lonergan continues: 
Name it what you please, alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry, 
active intelligence, the drive to know.  Under any name, it remains the same and is, I 
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trust, very familiar to you.  This primordial drive, then, is the pure question.  It is prior to 
any insights, any concepts, any words, for insights, concepts, words, have to do with 
answers; and before we look for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure 
question.
15 
Our texts, our decisions, and our actions are, I shall argue, contributions to law exactly inasmuch 
as they are governed by inner law;
16
 it is (exactly) individual and collective obedience to inner 
law, I shall argue, that creates authority and law. 
 Although Lonergan was right to insist that, in general, what you name this primal 
criterion is secondary to heeding its hegemony, the project at hand will hardly tolerate such 
linguistic license.  Positivists and others bent on a univocal definition of law will resist the usage 
according to which what is within us is “law,” but this usage is virtually required when one 
acknowledges that our rational consciousness, our subjectivity, is normatively ordered toward 
the real and the good.  Recognition of this primordial norm promulgated within our rational 
consciousness leads to the acknowledgment of its preeminent status as law, with all subsequent 
undertakings in the name of law somehow analogically and derivatively related to it.  For us, law 
begins within, and, if we heed it, proceeds outward through authority that allows the creation of 
particular laws for humans to live by.  
 The project of tracing our communal lawfulness to authority and ultimately to inner law 
will upset the sensibilities of souls bent on finding law that is so objective as to be (almost) able 
to claim its own instances.  But, getting to know ourselves, we just might discover that inner law 
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provides the foundation, a rock from and on which we can build.
17 
 Our compliance with it can 
create authority, and authority can speak (positive) law to us as individuals and as community.  
Inner law is not a rock after the manner of a “rail that runs surety through our judgments,”
18 
but it 
does promise to lead us, if we would choose to follow, to the real and the good.  The authority 
that it makes possible is not forceful, but it is correlative to our dignity as free beings capable of 
choosing intelligence over violence.  A rock that is the human spirit working itself out may not 
be what H.L.A. Hart’s absolute-absolutist had wanted, but it just may be what we need in order 
to assure authority, instead of authoritarianism, in what we do in the name of law.
19
  “Is everyone 
to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point?”
20  
       
 
II.  The Tempting of Scalia 
 To recognize inner law for what it means subordinating all else to it, and we should 
recognize right away that this subordination thwarts another familiar and forceful aspiration, the 
one Thomas Paine thought was satisfied in what the colonists were creating: “In America, the 
law is king.”
21 
 David Dudley Field was of the same mind:  “The law is our only sovereign.  We 
have enthroned it.”
22 
 The aspiration to which Paine and Field gave famous American expression 
is to displace the modern personal sovereign -- conjured variously and menacingly by Thomas 
Hobbes, Jean Bodin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Austin, among others -- with a sovereign 
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that just is human law.  On the typically modern conception, the (personal) sovereign was to be 
above the law, possessed of absolute and unconstrained power.
23
  On the view Paine and his 
progeny propound, by contrast, positive law is as high as it gets.  The substitution of sovereign 
law for the unconstrained personal sovereign is modernity’s hope to do better than Hobbes.
24
  
Hans Kelsen had something of the sort in mind, and, for its part, I am afraid, even the 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (published in English in Rome in 1994) refers 
to “the principle of the ‘rule of law,’ in which the law is sovereign . . . .”
25 
 Closer to home, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, having made a profound genuflection to democracy, has been tireless in 
his privileging of positive law:  “It is the law that governs us”
26
 – and the reference is to law of 
human, not higher, creation. 
 Among the grand theorists named above, the Justice and his jurisprudence deserve our 
special attention, and this for at least these two reasons.  First, unlike all the other grand theorists 
named above, Justice Scalia is sometimes in position to implement his theory in the name of the 
Constitution of the United States and without risk of being overruled by a higher court.
27 
 
Second, the Justice is, I wish to suggest, putting forward what those observant of inner law must 
regard as a specially treacherous form of pseudo-law, a system of rules backed by a species of 
authoritarianism.  Justice Scalia’s well-known ‘just apply the rules of law’ injunction, reinforced 
as it is by the common political bromides about the glories of democracy and the evils of 
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‘legislating from the bench,’ perhaps sounds banal or even common-sensical.  Behind its 
presuppositions and modes of proceeding, however, are entailments that, I would suggest, cut the 
legs of law out from under it by removing all possible sources of authority. 
 Justice Scalia’s announced twin-aims have been to make what we do in the name of law 
as much as possible (1) a system of rules contained in, or constructed from, (2) a closed universe 
of texts.  Textualism is the technical name for the second aim, and its boast, according to Justice 
Scalia, is that, by treating as the law itself the “objectified intent” lodged in the text the lawgiver 
promulgated, it delivers “a government of laws and not of men.”
28 
  
We look for a sort of “objectified” intent -- the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.  . . .  
[T]he reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply incompatible 
with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning 
of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated. . . .  . . .    Men may enact what they will; but it is only the laws that they 
enact which bind us.
29  
Texts, rather than the lawgivers’ meaning, are the law, and authority (or the lack thereof) is 
hardly tarried over.  What the lawgiver, a person (either individual or corporate), “meant” has 
been suppressed to make way for a text, what the lawgiver “promulgated.”  The limitation of the 
judicial role to giving coercive effect to text delivered by the government printing office is a 
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strategy that Justice Scalia took the occasion of a lecture at the Gregorian University in Rome to 
defend in particularly poignant terms:  
[M]y only authority as a judge to prevent the state from doing what may be bad things is 
the authority that the majority has given to the courts. . . .  To say, “Ah, but it is contrary 
to the natural law”, is simply to say that you set yourself above the democratic state and 
presume to decide what is good and what is bad in place of the majority of the people.  I 
do not accept that as a proper function. . .  Yes, it is dogmatic democracy . . . . 
I have been appointed to apply the Constitution and positive law.  God applies the natural 
law.
30 
Here, “authority” amounts to a democratically conferred license; the Justice’s “authority” is to 
function, as much as possible, as something of a conduit for democratically generated texts and 
the rules they contain.  
 
  
 To listen to Scalia describe the features of what he proposes, of textualism and “dogmatic 
democracy,” one might suppose that he is doing little more than reporting what is largely beyond 
dispute.  Just beneath the surface of the description, however, just beyond the modest “All I urge 
. . . ,” is a breathtaking campaign drastically to shorten (what H. Jefferson Powell refers to as) 
“the list of legitimate modalities”
31
 by which to approach the work of a federal judge and, with it, 
law in general.   
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 Like it or not, however, the grand theory urged must contend with the unacknowledged 
fact that the Constitution simply does not fix the modalities of its own construction and 
implementation, nor, for that matter, does it define “the Judicial Power” that it undertakes to 
vest.  These points are too plain to merit argument here.  Whatever its merits or demerits, 
textualism is one man’s (or a group’s) argument for a constitutional order of a certain kind.  At 
the very least, then, Scalia’s position should be acknowledged for what it is, “a proposal for 
radical reform.”
32
  The “distinguishing features” of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence are, in sum, 
that “(1) it is a system; (2) it is a system selected for plainly pragmatic reasons.  It represents an 
intentional effort to diminish the role of discretion and personality in the judicial enterprise.” 
33 
 
 That other Justices on the Court are up to more salacious mischief is no reason not 
to put Justice Scalia to the test.  I shall say a word about the upside of Scalia’s proposal at the 
end, but the untoward consequences and implications of constructing and inhabiting a system 
such as Scalia has in mind are my concern.  According to the Justice, the people have spoken; 
from now on, the law rules ex proprio vigore -- at least, that is, to the extent judges succeed in 
that all-important legal work of hemming themselves by interdicting the search for meaning.  
“Authority” amounts for Scalia simply to a democratically generated warrant, backed by the 
coercive power of the state, to behave in certain ways allegedly fixed (or nearly fixed) by “legal” 
texts.  The axiomatic, asymptotic elimination of the human person by the interposition of a 
system of texts entails the elimination of any possible source of genuine authority, that as 
worthiness of respect and even intelligent obedience?  Is this not the level on which we should 
live?   




 George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 Yale L. J. 1297, 1345 (1990).  Justice Scalia 
does count some, but only some, of the costs of texualism (or originalism).  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil,  57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989). 
 12 
 A possible preemptive reply would be to say that the democratically enacted text, given 
effect by a constitutionally licensed judge, is itself just as much authority as one can hope for.  
Such a reply becomes the more plausible the more one scratches the surface of Scalia’s 
textualism and observes that the textualist judge, his claimed passivity notwithstanding, invents 
and justifies his own role (through the aforementioned campaign for radical reform), thus 
becoming a sort of sub rosa authority, at least to the extent that his plea for a “textualist” 
judiciary succeeds in winning judicial adherents.  To the extent, moreover, the textualist 
succeeds in using law to create conditions in which justice has more of a chance of being done 
(than by, say, the judicial “activists” Scalia fingers), there is objective merit in what he is 
doing.
34
 So far, so good.    
 This line of reply eventually founders, however, on the fact that, whatever the admirable 
consequences of his efforts, the textualist judge is engaged in a systematic campaign to eliminate 
the problem of authority in law by eliminating the source of authority.  This he does by severing 
the link between, on the one hand, the meaning of texts human subjects create in the name of law 
and, on the other, the meaning those texts will have in the mind and hands of the judge giving 
them effect (and of the citizen receiving them and deciding what action to take).  
Notwithstanding his vigorous protestations that his role is virtually supine, the textualist does not 
so much conform to the meaning of the legal text, as he does construct it -- construct it, as he 
says, without regard to what the lawgiver meant.  Not looking for the real meaning of the text 





decisive point is that the successful textualist has decamped from a world in which texts come to 
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him with a meaning to be mined to a world of his own creation, a world in which he supplies the 
legislator’s texts with a meaning of his own construction.  One might call this an act or 
appearance of authority -- except that it is, in fact, authoritarian, for the simple reason that it 
amounts in the end to judicial ipse dixit.  Yes, the textualist canvasses dictionaries and other 




 The textualist judge turns out to be an ‘activist’ of a rambunctious sort, but meanwhile 
the appearances (of his deference and passivity) are kept up.  Persons are not allowed to appear -- 
this in order to make text, as much as possible, the only appearance in law.  The result is texts 
awaiting the assignment of meaning, authority in abeyance.  Joseph Vining catches the 
underbelly of textualism and “dogmatic democracy,” its ineluctable lack of authority:   
There is always an enormous difficulty, an enormous struggle in law particularly, to 
recall and keep in mind that language is evidence of meaning, not meaning itself.  The 
struggle comes from the thirst to know, for closure, that can always be slaked for the 
moment by illusion, but at a cost and often a terrible cost.  The difficulty, the struggle, is 
the difficulty of listening, and it is a person one listens to -- only a person, whom one 
approaches in good faith, which includes faith that there is a person to be heard.  
Axiomatic elimination of the person, at least from conscious presence in the reasoning 
mind, is a way of cutting short the struggle, stopping the work of listening.  It is precisely 
the elimination of the person that permits one to think of rules not as linguistic evidence 
but as having a real existence of their own.  . . . .  So there is always the temptation in law 
to approach a statute as if its words had meanings in themselves and by themselves -- the 
authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted to maintaining the supremacy of 
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democratic politics and legislative authority. . . .  But over the long run lawyers do not 
succumb.  They pull themselves away from the common temptation.  Something that has 
authority pulls you into the spirit of it.  Without spirit there can be no authority.  Without 
authority there is no law.
37 
  
The trouble with a system such as Scalia’s, so Vining suggests, is that it does what it can 
to hide -- and thus to leave unregulated -- the potential human sources of authority, thereby 
becoming authoritarian in the name of “dogmatic democracy.”  One might be tempted to reply 
that the lawgiver’s texts really do carry authority lodged within themselves and that my fear for 
authority’s absence is unfounded.  But if black marks on white pages carry authority in 
themselves, then perhaps too the etchings on rocks caused by centuries of random rubbings and 
collisions?  And the configurations of the clouds blowing by, and of sticks and twigs washed up 
on the sea’s shore?  
 I submit that authority in law requires the presence and appearance of persons, 
specifically, human subjects living out their orientation to the real and the valuable.  Though 
inevitably present in the legal world Justice Scalia confronts, these human sources of authority 
are deliberately eclipsed and law’s claim to bind is loosed to the extent the eclipse succeeds.  In 
developing this thesis, I shall put particular emphasis on the work of Joseph Vining, whom 
Steven Smith describes as “one of the most provocative but elusive legal thinkers of our time.”
38 
 
Whether the approach to authority can now be other than oblique, remains to be seen.   
 
III.  Diagnosing Denzingertheologie in Law? 
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 “Over the long run lawyers do not succumb . . . ,” Vining assures us.  But Scalia 
succumbs, and invites -- and sometimes forces -- the rest of us to come along.  Gordon Wood has 
opined that “[t]he real source of the judicial problem that troubles Justice Scalia lies in our 
demystification of the law, which is an aspect of the general demystification of all authority that 
has taken place in the twentieth century.”  Wood suggests that perhaps we should “remystify 
some of what lawyers and judges do”
39 
-- a suggestion Scalia would counter with the 
unexceptionable observation that the bell announcing Legal Realism cannot be unrung.
40 
 There 
is another alternative, however, one that only requires that we get to know ourselves -- not 
according to the reductive descriptions offered by the Realists, but as we really are.  Rather than 
“remystify” law, we might follow Joseph Vining and observe that what we do in law, 
notwithstanding what we sometimes say about it, is everywhere full of the traces of genuine 
authority, the legal manifestation of human spirit working itself out -- or, in my idiom, subjects 
obedient to inner law.  To observe and heed these appearances of authority is always a struggle, 
one that Scalia rejects with his frank and final preference for a system of legal rules.  
 Why, we might ask, does Justice Scalia succumb?  Why is Antonin Scalia, of all people, 
engaged in an “intentional effort” to construct as closed a system of law as possible?  “Dogmatic 
democracy” and textualism do not make the only response to Legal Realism, and some of the 
other possible responses, which mount a more frontal assault than Vining’s invitation to attend to 
what we in fact do that breathes authority in law, appear quite in line with the Catholic tradition 
that Scalia calls his own.
41 
 Scalia’s Catholicity and Catholic erudition  are concessa on all sides.  
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Justice Scalia, without engaging in a pseudo-remystification project, indulging a single woolly 
idea, or even struggling to follow Vining’s charting of authority’s pulse in the breadth and depth 
of our legal practice, could take his stand with St. Thomas Aquinas and say, contra textualism 
and “dogmatic democracy,” that an unjust law is no law at all (but instead a perversion of 
reason).
42
  Antonin Scalia, of all people, knows better than that “God applies the natural law.”  
He also knows that one can travel a long way with ‘legal positivism’ without denying, as 
textualism welded to “dogmatic democracy” does, that positive law cannot violate the natural 
law without thereby losing pro tanto its capacity to bind as a legal norm.
43  
 
  George Kannar’s insightful study of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence sheds light on this 
question, and, by doing so, contributes to an answer to our guiding question about the locus of 
authority in what we do in the name of law.  Kannar’s critical insight is that Scalia the Catholic 
was acculturated into a religio-theological world in which, when it comes to articulating what we 
believe in, or to stating the norms by which we are to live, “we” either do nothing or as little as 
possible -- or, at least, we cause ourselves to appear to do nothing or as little as possible.  More 
formative of Scalia’s legal mind than the “‘higher elements’ of the Catholic legal tradition” is, 
according to Kannar, the approach to text and history that prevailed in those self-effacing religio-
theological circles of Scalia’s youth.  Kannar urges that “in understanding that experience, a page 
of the Baltimore Catechism may be worth a volume of Aquinas.”
44 
 Even more helpful than a 
page of the Baltimore Catechism, I suggest, would be a page from the Enchridion Symbolorum 
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Definitionum et Declarationum De Rebus Fidei Et Morum, the text that in many ways provides 
the background not only to the Baltimore Catechism but to much else that grew up in Catholic 
practice during the period before the 1950s and 1960s.        
 Although Catholics who knew the Church before the Second Vatican Ecumenical 
Council (1962–65) were plenty familiar with the idea that in the Church’s magisterium there is 
‘authority,’ paradoxically the magisterium and many of the Church’s influential theologians 
minimized the need for or function of the voice of authority in the life of  Catholics.  (Which no 
doubt has something to with why so many Catholics of that period sadly, and unnecessarily, see 
the Church as an authoritarian institution).  The appearance sometimes created was one of the 
theologian or teaching-Church engaged in a kind of ventriloquism.  The method is described by 
Bernard Lonergan:       
What Karl Rahner refers to as Denzingertheologie, the late Pierre Charles of Louvain 
named Christian positivism.  It conceived the function of the theologian to be that of a 
propagandist for church doctrines.  He did his duty when he repeated, explained, 
defended just what had been said in church documents.  He had no contribution of his 





This way of doing theology takes the epithet by which it is known from the Enchiridion, 
the book of quotations from papal and conciliar pronouncements originally edited by Heinrich 
Denzinger in 1854.
46 
 As the tome went through dozens of editions over a century and a half, 
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Denzinger was succeeded by other editors of course, including the estimable theologian Karl 
Rahner, S.J. (1904–1984), but Denzinger’s name remained and named a method of theology 
enabled by the handy book of quotations.  The practitioner of Denzingertheologie proceeded by 
adducing proof-texts that were treated as timeless nuggets to be arranged and re-arranged as 
fresh situations might invite. The Church, in reaching new formulations of these dogmatic truths, 
was neither adding nor subtracting, merely giving new expression.  This is a complex 
phenomenon that is not readily summarized, but Kannar captures its thrust:   
[The Catholic world-view sought] to reduce thought to “formulae” rather than to inspire a 
deeper reflection on ultimate historical or moral values, or on any abstract higher law.  
‘The mode of theology was constant -- a simultaneous linking and severing in the 
Scholastic distinguo.  To know the terms was to know the thing, to solve the problem.  So 
we learned, and used, a vast terminology,’ all in the service of a life-absorbing, habit-
forming ‘urge to codify reality and capture it in rules.’  . . .  Linguistic essentialism seems 
second-nature.  To reject ‘policy’ as a starting point is thus a rather easy thing to do.
47 
         
This was the world of a decadent scholasticism, in which “[t]he chair is still the chair of Moses, 
but it is occupied by scribes and Pharisees.  Traditional doctrine is still taught, but it is no longer 
convincing.  The religious order still reads out the rules, but one may doubt that the home fires 
are still burning.”
48
  In such a world, some people’s ideal theologian comes to resemble “a parrot 
with nothing to do but repeat what has already been said.”
49
 
 Such was the way of much of the Catholic world in the period immediately before the 
Second Vatican Council did its work.  It is often said that the Council -- the definitive event in 
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the modern life of the Catholic Church -- ‘made changes’ in the Church.  As regards discipline 
and practice, this is plainly true.  At least as important, though, is the Council’s work on change 
itself:  “The meaning of Vatican II was the acknowledgment of history.”
50 
 The point Lonergan 
thus makes epigrammatically, and expounds and elaborates extensively elsewhere, is that at 





pretending to live outside of time and above change, the Church reinstated reality -- which 
includes the “deposit of faith” as well as the warp and woof of the change in which it is 
transmitted and received -- as the object of concern and inquiry.  Moving from what Lonergan 
called the “classicist” to the “historicist” operative stance, the Church recognized that her call to 
live in and by the truth entails the subordination of texts, even inspired texts, to fresh insights 
into those texts and the reality they concern.
52
  In its Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation 
(Dei verbum), the Council explained that “There is a growth in insight into the realities and 
words that are being passed on.”
53 
 Texts were thus freed to be the contingent and conditioned -- 
if hugely important, and, in the case of Scripture, inspired -- helps to understanding reality that 
they are.   
 What exactly the Church acknowledged in this connection at Vatican II is much 
debated,
54
 but present purposes do not require the taking of a stand on a disputed question.  This 
much is beyond dispute: any acknowledgment of change -- and there was some -- makes 
inescapable the question of what assures or guarantees, if anything does, that such change will be 
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in the right direction.  In short, without timeless texts as a putative last word, the role of authority 
in both assuring authentic development and preventing false development is out in the open.  
Thus exposed, the question has been the occasion of a most vigorous debate over the last nearly 
half-century.  With respect to growth in insight into divine revelation, however, Dei verbum 
already affirmed that those “in the episcopate,” to whom as a group in union with the Bishop of 
Rome the “deposit of faith” is entrusted, possess “the sure charism of truth” (“charisma veritatis 
certum”).
55 
 The question of authority can be debated, but there is no question but that the Church 
will not err in its interpretation of the deposit of faith.  Thus the magisterium of the Church, on 
herself and on divine revelation.   
 When it comes to matters of state and statecraft, however, there can of course be no hope 
of landing anyone or a group possessed of “the sure charism of truth,” -- indeed, we justly fear 
and flee those who are cocksure of themselves as concerns the extent of our and the neighbors’ 
civil liberties.  The Church’s divine assurance of not slipping into error assures that the 
discussion will concern how -- not whether -- her teaching is certainly true as concerns divine 
revelation and what is contained in it.  Architects of state, by contrast, lacking all assurance of 
access to the truth about human living, are remitted to what means of argument meet the test of 
our desire for the real and the valuable.  To return to a proximate example, even textualism in 
constitutional interpretation is not self-certifying, a point even Justice Scalia would be quick to 
concede (preferring to end his regress with “dogmatic democracy”).
56 
 We are possessed of a 
Constitution and a tradition of its interpretation, but even for the legal force of these a case must 
be made out, minds persuaded.    
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 In sum, the Church put away positivism by reminding us that what matters is living 
according to the truth, not according to formulations; Justice Scalia, by contrast, has staked his 
claim, and our collective living, on the legal analogue of Denzingertheologie.  Can we blame 
him?  Justice Scalia holds the view that statecraft has nothing to contribute to salvation.
57  
No 
doubt anticipating an eschatological rectification of the whole grand mess, Scalia would commit 
us for now to the legal analogue of “Christian positivism.”  Leaving it to God to implement the 
natural law, Scalia takes his rest on a system of texts.  Again:  “[T]here is always the temptation 
in law to approach a statute as if its words had meanings in themselves and by themselves -- the 
authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted to maintaining the supremacy of democratic 
politics and legislative authority.”   
 
IV.  Resisting the Temptation -- Holding Out for Authority 
 “When literate cultures are in crisis, the crisis is most evident in the question of what they 
do with their exemplary written texts.”
58 
 Scalia is an important phase in -- not the whole of -- 
legal history; “over the long run lawyers do not succumb.”  But if they do not succumb -- 
because they discern that nothing less than living in a way equal to our human dignity is at issue, 
still we have to ask exactly how it is that we can use texts in law without becoming authoritarian 
about them.  If Scalia’s solution to the problem of human living has the faults that we have been 
outlining, still we should not underestimate the problem to which textualism sometimes seems to 
be the solution.  As Mary Ann Glendon has commented cryptically but clearly enough, “Our 
legal culture also explains why many friends of democratic and rule-of-law values have been 
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driven to expound what most civil lawyers would regard as excessively rigid forms of 
textualism.”
59 
 Texts have the apparent advantage that they are there to be paid attention to -- 
whereas everyone acknowledges that authority, even if it be real, is nothing anyone can touch or 
point toward.     
 Although there is occasionally serious discussion of it in the Anglo-American 
jurisprudential literature, authority remains an outlier in scholarship on law.
60
  In fact, from the 
threshold law’s initiation rites disparage the conditions of authority, only half by accident.  I 
refer to the ‘orientation’ in which first-year law students are told -- frequently by instructors 
reciting some out-of-date, photocopied text that has been provided by someone ‘in charge of 
orientation’ -- that our way of doing law, which will be the object of their attention for the next 
three years of their lives, affirms and depends upon ‘a hierarchy of authorities.’  But such stilted 
discourse rings hollow, and within days or at most weeks, dis-orientation takes hold.  No longer 
delayed by questions of ‘authority’ and implausible ‘hierarchies’ of the same, students are busy 
dividing the legal engine between ‘law’ and the lawless, that is, between ‘black letter law’ and 
‘policy.’  Echoing too many professors and a profusion of ‘study guides,’ law’s students have 
begun to imagine that law is what it is and speaks for itself; and policy, no one need be told, has 
always its advocates to advocate for it.  This is only one man’s report from the classroom, but he 
has heard the basis of it a thousand times:  “Professor, are you making a policy argument or is 
this the black-letter law you’re talking about?”  As for Justice Scalia, it’s just as simple as that -- 
or, at least, one can always say that it’s that simple.   
 But practicing lawyers, or at least the better ones, know better -- know that texts are not 
as handy as the textualist would have you believe and that ‘policy’ isn’t an adequate description 
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of the what-else that goes into making law.  Lawyers do not just find texts, black-marks packed 
with rules ready to be dislodged and ‘applied,’ or dislodged and then massaged with policy until 
ripe to be given effect.  Lawyers turn to texts alright, but as part of a process very different from 
the one outlined during ‘orientation.’  As Vining observes, “the texts to which they turn are 
selected and are old, necessarily from the past, requiring translation over time and between 
languages and places, year to year, decade to decade.”
61 
 Denzinger left the texts in the Greek or 
Latin in which he found them, but he did do the work of selection for generations of Catholic 
theologians, many of whom forgot that there had been selecting
62 
-- this despite the introductory 
note “Selectio documentorum,” and the additional introductory note on the authority of the 
included selections, “Valor documentorum.”  Lawyers lack a Denzinger.  As practicing lawyers 
know, they -- and judges too -- must do their own selecting.   
 Denzinger limited his selections to papal and conciliar pronouncements, for reasons that 
find ready (though by no means uniform) resonance in the Catholic tradition.  But what are the 
practicing lawyer’s or the sitting judge’s principles of exclusion and inclusion?  It would seem to 
be at least in part a matter of “selection” that the Constitution of the United States rather than, 
say, the Articles of Confederation or the Code of Justinian, or a recipe on a shelf in Gary 
Lawson’s kitchen
63 
is to be consulted for what is to be law for us here and now -- but on what 
principle?  The constitutions and statutes of forgotten empires line the walls of the great 
museums and libraries, but are they to be selected?  What of “foreign law?”  What of the 
assertions by members of the current Supreme Court that foreign sources of law should -- or 
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should not -- be consulted?  ‘Overruling’ is a fact of legal life the legitimacy of which no one 
denies; but if Plessy v. Ferguson is still ‘on the books’ -- or at least ‘in’ the U.S. Reports, but 
presumably it is no longer evidence of what is law for us.  And so forth.  
 Resisting this destabilizing claim, an objector will object that “surely” what the 
legislature, “our legislature,” gives us is “the law.”  “Certainly,” it will be said, “what the U.S. 
Congress casts into the world, that has gone un-vetoed and survived judicial-review, is law for us 
in America.  Which is why,” the etymologically-edified objector will continue, “we call it a 
legislature, not a consideration-bearer.  Surely, at least within the confines of these United States, 
what the Congress launches is law, it being granted on all sides that in a cloistered monastery 
lodged on the coast of a remote island on the opposite side of the world, what the U.S. Congress 
issues by way of the Government Printing Office is no more ‘the law’ than is the wisdom of a 
Doonesbury cartoon that appears on the same day.”   
 What this well-intentioned line of objection overlooks is how and why even here and 
now, the achievement of Congress’s voting for, promulgating, and publishing some black marks, 
which then go un-vetoed by the President and survive ‘judicial review,’ does not as such achieve 
law for us.  As Vining says, “Statutes and regulations are only candidates for attention, not just in 
competition for enforcement resources, but in the very analysis of situations.  This is to be 
observed historically from without.  It is also experienced by lawyers, from within.”
64 
 Vining 
softens the blow of this insight by exemplifying the point from another continent:   
The piece of writing that emerges from Parliament is not the law.  It is evidence of the 
law, which is used in the course of arriving at a statement of law. . . .  Legislation is the 
arbitrary which we allow -- but also limit.  To make the point in its strongest form, it 
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could be said legislation is lawless behavior, except that by a paradoxical trick we make 
legislative statutes materials we use in determining what the law is.
65  
   
To take a more proximate example from contemporary administrative law as it is practiced on 
this continent, section 706 the Administrative Procedure Act (1946) states that a “reviewing 
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that fails any one of a number of 
statutorily defined criteria.  But when, in 2002, it was presented with an argument that it must set 
aside an agency action that it had found unlawful, the  United States Court of Appeals for D.C. 
Circuit said, per Judge Silberman, that it “is simply not the law” that it must set aside the 
unlawful agency action; and for this proposition of discretion to decide whether to set aside the 
unlawful agency action, Judge Silberman cited earlier precedent of the same court decided in 
1993 (while ignoring the contrary precedent decided in 1994).
66  
To say what the law is, requires 
taking all this -- what is said or not said, what is done or not done -- into consideration.   
 To put the point more broadly, the possibility of the executive veto, which invites the 
possibility of the super-majority; the possibility of judicial invalidation on review or on collateral 
attack -- these are but incidents of legislative text’s not being law ex proprio vigore.  With 
exceptions that prove the rule, we do not give effect as law what we cannot or will not say is 
worthy of being acted upon intelligently.  No lawyer arguing to a court about the correct 
disposition of agency action found unlawful can ignore section 706; at the same time, it would 
fly in the face of intelligent practice to ignore that the text has not been dispositive of what has 
been done in all cases in which it was relevant.  Lawyers and others engaged in the process of 
ascertaining the law look both to what has been, and to what is being, done:   
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Words of law are not givens of the world . . . .  The very words themselves are not given.  
They are found.  Even focal texts, that become concrete particulars of the lawyer’s world 
from time to time, carry no meaning a lawyer can reach up and break off like a bit of 
crystal.  Constructing a statement of law to be acted upon, a lawyer constantly seeks a 
real meaning, drawn from all the evidence.  The evidence is not only other words.  It 
includes action, what is done.
67
 
And this fact about what we do, that trumps what we sometimes say, brings us nearer the heart of 
the matter.  We might say that the principle of exclusion and inclusion is given in part by 
something operative inside the lawyer engaged in what we call ‘the legal process.’  In Vining’s 
way of putting it, “The past and its texts enter the experience of legal authority through legal 
method and its presuppositions, which are subtler than statements commonly made about them 
would suggest . . . .”
68 
    
 Lost on -- or denied by -- the maestro who looks for law exactly in text is the fact that 
before there can be law, there is a person making a decision.  Democratically enacted rules of 
general applicability -- whatever their wisdom and whatever their appeal to Friedrich Hayek -- 
do not of their own vigor rise to the level of law for any community.  No particular text or 
assemblage of texts stands as the law; and though it makes sense as a kind of shorthand to refer 
(as we do) to law’s textual sources as the law itself, it makes nonsense of law to go on then to 
imagine that it exists apart from decisions leading to conduct.  “There is always, in law, a 
decision maker, and what are called rules in law are expressions of considerations to be taken 
into account by a decision maker.”  Vining continues:   
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They focus not on themselves as a self-contained system but upon decision-making 
activity pointing forward.  Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an image of 
law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal rules have in fact, always a 
decision that must be made, at the edge of lives that have not been lived before, in a 
world that has not been seen before.
69 
Again, what the simplifications of the positivists and codifiers miss, in their efforts to get law 
nailed down, is that there is no law unless decisions are being made to guide conduct in the name 
of law.  The question of what conduct is proper or permissible is a question of concrete fact, and 
unless we are talking about guides to conduct, we aren’t quite talking about law, though we may 
be talking about its sources or about what gives evidence of it.  And when it comes to what 
should shape and structure our guides to conduct in the inevitable thick of life’s particulars, 
nothing is ruled out a priori, at least not absolutely. 
Lawyers do not have nice specifications of what evidence can be looked to when 
inquiring what the law is on a matter.  There is a technique, which is to focus on a canon 
of texts and, if they are available, upon central texts generated by an institutional 
arrangement that is usually hierarchical in form.  But in reading those texts, reading them 
seriously to understand them, lawyers do not “exclude evidence” (as a litigating lawyer 
would say), close their eyes to evidence of meaning (or lack of meaning).  Some of that 
evidence is of the kind we call sociological.  All of the evidence is about the life of the 
aspirations and ways of thinking with which lawyers work . . .  There is as a consequence 
no notion of the “purely legal.”  Legal discourse is not a closed system.  The meaning of 
texts is a real meaning.
70
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Why must this be so?  Because it is intelligent human life and aspirations that are at issue/  
We do not confront “law” as largely inert automatons:  We come to law, and deciders create law, 
because of the constitutive human eros to discover the truth and to discover and instantiate the 
valuable.  We can do less, but what essays in ‘law’ that start some place other than with the 
importunate human subject miss is that law is about us, about us as we are and might yet 
become.  ‘Law’ that does not respond to our genuine needs reaches us as that “unintelligible 
restraint.”  Law is a tool to assist in satisfying the human longing – the demand of inner law -- to 
discover and live by the truth and to discover and instantiate the valuable; what fails to fulfill this 
function fails pro tanto to be law.  Like other artifacts of our human creation, law cannot be used 
-- except perversely -- to frustrate the purposes, both those given and those chosen -- of those 
who create it and who need it, of those always, already subject to inner law.   
 With respect to texts specifically, it is inevitable that those who create them today in aid 
of human living risk that those who come the next day will live in the past and dodge the day.  
But the practicing lawyer, tightly situated within the practical matrix of the work of making 
statements of law to be lived by, will -- and, we can say, should -- use the inherited texts not to 
dodge, but to meet, today’s exigencies.  That he sometimes does what he knows to be less is not 
an argument for settling for less in what we do in the name of law.  Inner law does not go on 
holiday.      
 This subordination of texts in law to the (life) project of which they are a part risks 
appearing to undervalue texts, so it will be worthwhile to emphasize why this appearance would 
be false.  It is easy to identify the shortcomings of Denzingertheologie without appearing to 
slight the relevant texts, for no one engaged in Christian theology flirts with jettisoning sacred 
text.  When, however, we observe that practicing lawyers regard -- and argue that practicing 
 29 
lawyers should regard --  texts as potential contributors to statements of law, not as the law itself 
and by itself, then we can seem to some insufficiently appreciative of text.  What good lawyers 
do with text is very much like what students of sacred texts do with their texts, however, and the 
reasons for this similarity, overlap, as Vining observes: 
Close reading, reading in every detail and in every way, is at the very center of what 
lawyers qua lawyers do, and other parts of lawyers’ method and the institutional structure 
of law are designed to make close reading possible.  Anything closely read and reread 
must be there some time, always aging, if only to permit rereading.  The rereading of 
some texts, the Confucian, the Vedaic, the Torah, for example, may go on forever. 
But the large fact remains that in law focal texts, no matter how old, are not fixed.  No 
legal text is immune from challenge and substitution, not even statute or constitutional 
provision.  If one does not understand a text despite all efforts of one’s own and others, if 
in the end it does not fit, has no resonance, it then cannot hold its place. . . .  
No one, again, simply mouths the words of legal texts.  They are read for their meaning, 
translated, restated by one who, responsible for the effects of what he says and does, will 
give orders or contribute to orders as he believes himself to be ordered by what he hears.  
The search for authority is a search for a voice beyond the brute facts of the past 
unfolding into the present.
71  
  
Lawyers, like priests, turn to texts; and they pay them most careful heed.  But just as the 
priest does not elide the text at hand with the Word of God, the lawyer does not substitute text 
for law.  Lawyers turn to texts, which they have selected and arranged; these they read 
assiduously, not to echo them but in aid of making a statement of law to be acted upon.  But that 
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statement, though not determined by text, is not ungoverned:  It must satisfy the speaker’s need 
to speak only what is worthy of being acted on.  What gives the statement its worthiness to be 
acted upon?  The answer, which I have been suggesting, is encapsulated in this passing 
observation by Lonergan: “one has only to peruse such a collection of conciliar and pontifical 
pronouncements as Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum to observe that each is a product of its 
place and time and that each meets the questions of the day for the people of the day.”
72
  One can 
turn to texts to engage in archaeology, or to find palindromes, or to . . . . .  One can generate texts 
to entertain, to edify, or to . . .   Alternatively, one can turn to texts, and one can generate texts, in 
aid of meeting “the questions of the day for the people of the day” as concerns their living in 
community where, in the name of the community, justified coercion can be used to back certain 
kinds of conduct and eliminate others.     
 In this seemingly innocuous formulation -- “meet[ing] the questions of the day for the 
people of the day” -- is contained the very heart of the matter, the core of a whole philosophy of 
law for worthy human living.  Those who would say what the law is, and thus, expect obedience 
and not mere strategic compliance, must be meeting the questions of the day.  Those not meeting 
the questions of the day are not worthy of being listened to by the people of the day, certainly not 
worthy of being obeyed by the people of the day.  It would be a violation of their (our) own 
obligation to honor inner law to subordinate themselves (ourselves) to authorities ignoring their 
(our) questions.  Those not meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day are, as 
lawyers say, irrelevant and immaterial -- and perhaps even prejudicial.  Those worth listening to 
and obeying, because they do meet the questions of the day for the persons of the day, speak with 
authority.  Vining says of the mind that possesses authority that it possesses it in virtue of its 
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caring.  “For law, mind is caring mind.  Mind that does not care is no mind to seek, no mind to 
take into oneself, no mind to obey: it has no authority.”
73 
       
 In the idiom I introduced at the outset, the mind possessed of authority is the human 
subject who is obedient to inner law.  To be meeting the questions of the day for the people of 
the day -- through all the quotidian researching, selecting, interpreting, evaluating, drafting, 
revising, submitting, arguing, re-arguing, collaterally attacking, and so forth -- is to be meeting 
that constitutive human eros that orders us out of ourselves to discover and affirm what is and 
what is valuable and, then, to live accordingly.  It is the very process of answering the questions 
that issue from our rational nature itself that generates authority.  The process is not ungoverned, 
but neither does the constitutive criterion to which it is subject enter arbritrarily or violently.  The 
eros for the real and the valuable enters from the lawyer’s own rational subjectivity; and though 
we are passive with respect to its entering, it enters, unless we block it for the time being.  It 
never coerces our compliance, however, but awaits free obedience.  This constitutive eros for the 
real and the valuable, “the pure question,” must by mistaken for the degenerate phenomenon that 
is idle curiosity or episodic questioning; it is, rather, the unrestricted desire to know the real and 
the valuable, which manifests itself in ever fresh questions that we can either meet or evade.
 74
  
 “Name it what you please,” this eros drives and structures our worthy human living, and 
it does not make an exception for law, not even for “dogmatic democracy.”  Refusing to be 
dogmatic, it asks to govern the practicing lawyer’s use of texts in aid of coming to decisions of 
law to be acted upon.  This is not to make the silly claim that the work-a-day practicing lawyer is 
thematically aware of “inner law;” the suggestion is, rather, that when he or she is struggling to 
speak with the requisites of authority, the practicing lawyer obeying inner law; and that when he 
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or she is nagged by the injustice of unanswered questions and loose ends not tied up, it is the 
violation of inner law that is registering in conscience.  
 In sum:  Those living in conformity with inner law avoid the temptation to transmute our 
quest for law into the imposition of unintelligible restraint.  Awaiting our dedication to meeting 
its demands, inner law does not coerce us.  The “pure question” reaches us from within, not ab 
extra, and it constitutes our very rationality and intelligence; choosing to honor it is to live on the 
level of the dignity of our rational natures.  To do less remains possible, but settling for less 
leaves our normative and unrestricted demand for answers to the questions unmet, our human 
potential denied.  “Every closing off, blocking, denial of the empirically, intelligently, rationally, 
freely, responsibly conscious subject is also a closing off, a blocking, of the dominance of the 
higher aspirations of the human spirit and the human heart.”
75 
 What we cannot do, without 
violating inner law, is to meet some questions arbitrarily or ignore others:  “Negatively, . . . the 
unrestricted desire excludes the unintelligent and uncritical rejection of any question, and 
positively the unrestricted desire demands the intelligent and critical handling of every 
question.”
76  
The human subject who dodges questions lacks authority, even in ‘law.’          
 
V.  Locating Authority in Law:  the Problem of Authorities 
 We have traced law to authority, and authority to mind obedient to inner law; not text, but 
the mind meeting the questions of the day for the persons of the day speaks with authority.  But 
not everyone who can speak with authority can go on to bind with the coercive power of the law 
backed by the might of ‘the state.’  We confront, therefore, the relationship between authority 
and authorities. 
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 A brute fact that frequently comes down to us from the past, and frequently obscures the 
line between authority and authoritarianism, concerns authorities, a fact reflected in the 
ambivalent connotation and denotation of this English word ‘authorities.’  Sometimes the 
‘authorities’ are law enforcement folk conspicuous for their bluntness; other times the 
‘authorities’ are those who will get the work of justice done.  When we ‘call in the authorities,’ 
or the authorities just arrive on the scene, we hope for the latter, but fear the former.  We face the 
fact of men and women who ask to be regarded as authorities over us; the critical issue is to 
distinguish between those authorities who possess authority and those who cloak the 
authoritarian in legal garb.  “The barbarian may wear a Brooks Brothers suit.”
77  
 
 The problem -- we can call it the problem of the authoritarianism of false authorities -- 
grows out of the conditions of cooperation.  Acting alone, we can get very little done; re-
inventing the wheel assures either boredom or, in the alternative, an early demise.  Cooperation, 
both across the ages and in the here and now, gets things done, and makes maintenance, and 
perhaps then improvement, possible.  Cooperation can occur quite spontaneously, but the limits 
of spontaneous cooperation prove to be severe.  Cooperation, if it is to continue, must be 
regularized.  The more cooperation is reticulated, ramified, and reinforced, the more powerful it 
becomes, and the more that can be accomplished.  Spontaneity gives way to custom, and custom 
gives way to more formalized institutions.  Offices are created, defined, and populated.  Those 
who populate the offices we know as authorities, that is, “the officials to whom certain offices 
have been entrusted and certain powers delegated.”
78   
  
 As long as the authorities remain faithful to their offices and to the purposes for which 
those offices were created, and as long as conditions remain unchanged, things go as they did 
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from the beginning.  But conditions do not remain unchanged among the living.  At the very 
least, new questions emerge.  To take another example from administrative law, the question 
arises whether it would not be better for those charged with administering government benefits to 
proceed according to a grid rather than on a case-by-case basis?  Would this not tend to assure 
more thoroughly informed and, therefore, intelligent results?
79  
We might be able to go on doing 
things the old way, but these new questions invite new answers.  Correlatively, the fact of new 
learning clarifies the possibility, and invites satisfaction of the conditions of, progressive and 
cumulative learning. Cooperation is not just horizontal; as I observed above, it can be vertical 
and span the ages.  In order to meet the questions of the day, changes will have to be made to 
accommodate and assure new learning (without becoming amnesiac about what we already 
know, condemning ourselves to reinventing the wheel). 
  Meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day means keeping up with new 
questions.  To the extent, however, that offices have been designed and parceled out in a brittle 
way, the office holders will lay claim to terra firma on which to resist new questions and the new 
directions in which they might lead.  And even offices designed and parceled out with an 
openness to adaptation may by now be populated by authorities who have grown officious; 
instead of continuing the pattern of growing and ramifying cooperation that produced and 
populated the offices in the first place, the authorities dig in their heals and rule some challenges 
out of court.  Today’s questions are stifled; the possibility of progressive and cumulative 
learning, and with it more developed living, is denied.  Stasis sets in and then is enforced; people 
begin to talk about the offices as though informed by Platonic Forms.  “[M]y only authority as a 
judge to prevent the state from doing what may be bad things is the authority that the majority 
has given to the courts.” 
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 To press the mutability of offices is not to call for (what Judge Noonan once referred to 
as) “a roving constitutional convention;” indeed, quite the reverse.  It won’t do to live, as 
Michael Oakeshott said of Descartes, every day as though it were one’s first.  For the reasons I 
have been developing, offices need to be structured in such a way as to facilitate drawing on and 
further developing (and, as necessary) correcting the inherited knowledge and wisdom.  Nothing 
short of “the stages of human historical process” depend on people’s success in developing 
methods for becoming “more reasonable and responsible in the various arrangements of their 
cooperative and personal living.”
80 
 The creation of offices that allow us to live more reasonably 
and responsibly, by meeting the questions of the day, is the low door in the wall that leads to a 
decent or perhaps even better future.  As Joseph Flanagan observes portentously: “We can mark 
off the major periods in the history of culture by the way different historical communities control 
[the] functions of knowing and choosing, or by the different methods that cultures have 
developed to govern their personal and collective making of history.”
81 
 The key is to keep the 
offices in service of living, in service -- that is, not of the status quo ante, but of progressive and 
cumulative learning that meets the questions of each new day. 
  The original parcelings-out of office, by custom and usage, were justified in fact by their 
contributing to meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day.  As custom and usage 
gives way to law, the legalistic solution is always just around the regulatory corner.  Legalism 
enjoys some of law’s aura and prestige, but is much more efficient.  Its peculiar genius is not to 
get hung up on the questions of the day; its flaw is that, at least in the long run, it would prove 
fatal for the persons whose questions go unmet.  Of course, if we succeed in ignoring or denying, 
first, that persons have questions about how to live and live well, or, second, that in that failing to 
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meet them in our collective living is to violate the inner law that we humans have in common, 
then we inure ourselves to some of the consequences of their going unanswered.  We get used to 
that phenomenon identified by the philosopher-historian Eric Voegelin as the interdict on the 
question,
82




 A complete anaesthesia of the desire for the real and the valuable -- an effective 
repression of the pure question -- is a rare occurrence, however.  Whatever the case with the 
neighbors (or the aliens or the poor or the disenfranchised) and what we hear said to be ‘good 
enough’ for them, we have our own -- and those we love and care about have their own -- 
questions.  We want to know this world, to know what is valuable.  Inner law keeps inviting us to 
transcend the isolation of pure interiority, inviting us to answer and not to interdict the questions 
that are our bridge to the real and the good.  Our wanting to be knowers, our wanting to be 
people who discover the valuable -- this is half, but only half, of the core of authority in law. 
 Not only do we desire to know the valuable; we also and concomitantly desire to 
instantiate it in our living.  This is the other half.  Just as knowing has its conditions (which are 
either satisfied or not), however, so, too, does instantiating the valuable.  Desiring and knowing 
the valuable are not sufficient to the realization of its instances.  There is nothing abstract or arm-
chair about this: Concretely, succeeding -- realizing the valuable in our living --requires 
cooperation, and cooperation works itself out in social structures.  Social structures -- such as 
economies, school districts, clubs, and corporations -- succeed by helping us meet the questions 
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The social structure that is the legal system, our current concern, is good at getting us 
authorities, but the question ever remains whether the authorities are assisting us in meeting the 
questions of the day, questions about how to instantiate the valuable here and now, and 
tomorrow.  Authorities who do in fact assist us in this project possess authority; they lack 
authority who block or fail to assist our common engagement in this process of creating and 
developing structures that lead to instances of valuable living.  In the context of law, the other 
half of authority’s core consists of the concrete conditions in which we succeed in instantiating 
the valuable in our living. 
The locus of authority in what we do in the name of law, then, is the community engaged 
in the ongoing work of asking and answering questions about the real and the valuable and 
creating the conditions for the progressive and cumulative entrance of knowledge about and the 
realization of what is truly valuable.  Authority appears in the concrete judgments the 
community’s decision-makers -- the community’s ‘authorities’ -- reach in the name of the law.  
But though those appearances of authority are the personal achievements of individual human 
subjects, they would lack the authority necessary to be law for the community to the extent that 
they did not reflect and bear the community’s inherited but cutting-edge insights into valuable 
living.  Not for any reason having to do with the priority of “democracy,” but because of the 
community’s non-fungible accumulation of wisdom into the conditions of valuable living and 
ongoing engagement with the questions of the day, the community possesses authority.  
Descartes, by assaying to live every day as though it were his first, cut himself off from the 
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community and thus from the possibility of meeting the questions of the day for the people, other 
than himself, of the day.  Those who are meeting the questions of the day for the people of the 
day enjoy authority; those who are doing this on behalf of the community and with authorization 
to give it effect, even coercive effect if necessary, are the locus of authority in law.        
 Bernard Lonergan identifies authority with “the community that has a common field of 
experience, common and complementary ways of understanding, common judgments and 
common aims.”
85  
If there is a terminological trouble with this identification, it concerns 
Lonergan’s locating authority in the community without regard to the nature and quality of that 
community’s field of common judgments and aims.
86 
 On Lonergan’s usage, a community of 
persons would enjoy authority no matter how dogmatically closed it was to further learning.  
Lonergan does go on at once to distinguish between “authentic” and “unauthentic” fields of 
common judgments and aims, and, thus, between authentic authority and unauthentic authority.  
Fundamentalist communities would therefore possess authority, but lack “authentic authority.”  
Lonergan’s usage is workable, but it would seem more to the point, and truer to common usage, 
to identify as authority -- and authoritative -- the community that is engaged in and committed to 
furthering judgments and aims that ask and answer the questions of the day, and as authoritarian 
the community that is collectively engaged in blocking the asking and answering of questions.   
We began by inquiring “the locus of authority in what we do in the name of law.”  We 
have answered by tracing such authority to the community, more specifically, a community 
‘living by the question’ -- that is, engaged in a common enterprise of asking and answering 
questions and then cumulatively and progressively creating the conditions that allow living by 
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the results.  Decisions guiding conduct and taken in the name of law rise to the level of law for 
the community by their being bearers of the community’s present body of insight into valuable 
living and the means of its achievement.  The creation and preservation of texts can aid the 
progressive and cumulative development of insight into such human living and the creation of 
conditions therefor; approached another way and with lesser purposes, the same texts can stunt 
or block valuable human living.  If, as the possibility of progressive and cumulative results will 
demand, the community ‘transmits’ its authority to agents with specific offices, thereby creating 
authorities, satisfaction of the conditions of authority ever remains necessary if the authorities are 
not to sink to the level of authoritarian bureaucrats.
87  
 
 As to exactly how those conditions can be satisfied once such a transmission has been 
effected, something remains to be said in the final Section.  What I would emphasize first, 
however, is that to the extent that the authorities have given up being part of a communal project 
of asking and answering questions -- that is, if, in Lonergan’s idiom, they have given up being 
authentic -- to that extent they have divested themselves of authority.  Nor, would it matter that 
the office ‘requires’ this of them.  Authorities may continue to wear the externalia, the badges of 
office that allow them to be recognized and distinguished from the vigilante; but unless they are 
in fact bearers of the community’s learning about and quest for valuable living, they are mere 
authorities who lack authority.  Whether someone merely wears the badges of office or actually, 
in addition, possesses authority -- this remains always a question of concrete fact. 
Besides authority there are also needed authorities.  If there are to be authorities, then 
over and above their authenticity there is needed some external criterion by which their 
position can be publicly recognized.  But while this external condition is a necessary 
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condition, it is not a sufficient condition.  The sufficient condition must include 
authenticity.  The external criterion need not be accompanied by authenticity.  For in 
human beings authenticity always is precarious.  Commonly, indeed, it is no more than a 
withdrawal from unauthenticity.   
 
Such, then, is the dialectic of authority.
88  
   
  
Authorities do not necessarily act with authority.  There is the ultra vires act; more 
fundamentally, there is the act by the authority that, forsaking what authority it might have 
enjoyed, becomes officious and ceases to engage in meeting the questions of the day for the 
people of the day.  By not allowing the questions of the day to occur, the authority decamps from 
authority to the authoritarian.  It can be subtle, but its effect is blunt.  Correlatively, authority, 
and with it law, is forever a fragile achievement.  
 
VI.  The Dialectic of Authority: A Sure End to “Sovereignty” 
 This dialectic, “the dialectic of authority,” will come as a disappointment to some.  
Among the disappointed will be those who had hoped to get on in law with as little appearance 
of genuine authority as possible; for these, such as Justice Scalia, the admission of authority in 
law, as other than a democratically sanctioned license, amounts to a necessity to be minimized.  
Also among the disappointed will be those who, frankly admitting the need for non-marginal 
authority in the legal enterprise, would lodge and cabin it in firmly delineated offices and their 
officious personnel; for these, linking authority -- and, with it, law -- to a ‘dialectic’ undermines 
the very solidity that law and its rule of rules were supposed to be about.  But this dialectic, 
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though not what many had wanted, may be just what we need; it is, in any event, the best we can 
do, though we often do much less.     
 Or, rather, seen from another angle, we often purport to do very much more.  Law that is 
nothing short of “sovereign” is what David Dudley Field boasted.  The alternative position 
developed here has been that, in the sense in which we ordinarily speak of it, law is necessarily 
subordinate to (the dialectic of) authority and to inner law, and, therefore, never possessed of 
sovereignty.  Of course, ‘sovereignty’ is a slippery enough term that, with a little effort, one 
might be able to make it fit human law that is subordinate to authority and inner law.  But, as 
Stanley Benn concluded in his study of sovereignty, “there would seem to be a strong case for 
giving up so Protean a word,”
89 
and that case, as made out by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), is 
that “the term needed [in constructive political discourse] is not Sovereignty.”
90
  The word 
conjures a legal regime that is a closed system from which no appeal lies.  It was Maritain’s 
sober judgment that “[t]he two concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged 
together on the same anvil.  They must be scrapped together.”
91 
  
 The United States of today is no totalitarianism of the sort Maritain was reacting against, 
of course.  However, a state in which (we are told) God takes care of the natural law and the 
judge simply dispatches the democratic majority’s business (except in the limit case in which he 
recuses himself), is a state that has smuggled pseudo-sovereignty in through the back door of the 
courthouse.  What humans do in the name of the law is always only penultimate, never sovereign 
or absolute.  If, as Vining says, lawyers (like priests) sometimes speak for the sovereign,
92 
this 
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would be because they live in the dialectic of authority, not pretending to sovereignty but seeking 
authority in the only place it can be found. 
What is created in decision making by participants in the process [of law] can never be 
celebrated as individuals’ self-governance -- their own however contingent or arbitrary, 
legitimate whatever it is -- for it is not their own lot but others’ that is being fashioned. 
Knowledge of this is part of knowledge of law and continuously reconfirmed by practice 
in the actual operations of the organized human world.  This is the strength of law, this 
knowledge.  All are trustees, participants and decision makers alike, arguing, deciding, 
approving, reacting.  All is discussion of value, all is drawn forward by value, all 
identification through time with those who are affected in the future and those who have 
made decisions in the past is through value.  And the central concern of law, atheoretical, 
pretheoretical, is then connection of value and responsible mind, for value not connected 
by mind to responsible belief is mirage, nothing, vanishing when questioned or sought. 
Thus law is at work before any political theory, and after political theory is finished 
speaking: nothing is secured by any tracing of power or jurisdiction to a formal source or 
process, kingly, judicial, legislative, or popular.  Against the constant fading of the 
conditions of authority is what comes from law that pushes toward the personal and a 
context of decision making in which the personal can be recognized, recognition of the 
personal being the only entrance to the experience of authority.
93 
  
In law, there is always a decision maker; which is why Vining is right to focus on the 
action of the individual’s mind bringing value to bear on a decision of consequence.  That 
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individual subject acting through office in the name of the law, though he alone is responsible for 
satisfying the conditions that give him authority, does so by drawing on the common fund and 
dynamic of the community.  Although the community needs its authorities, and thus to create 
offices, it is the community itself that is jurisgenerative -- not by merely being a democratic 
majority, but, as I have argued, by living by the question.  The common strain of thought that 
looks for law in the dictates of the state to the individual overlooks the true springs of authority 
in the community’s common engagement in asking questions, answering them, and then, with 
the help of authorities, living by those answers.   
 Which brings me to the issue I reserved above, viz., how the conditions of ‘living by the 
question’ are satisfied once the community has transmitted its authority to authorities.  This is a 
complex problem, which I can address here only in outline.  The preceding analysis has clarified 
that there is no authority where its conditions are not satisfied; the problem that attends the 
simple failure of those conditions to be satisfied is the different problem of counterfeit 
authorities, that is, of authoritarianism.  This seems simple enough, except that the satisfaction of 
the conditions of authority is not, however, a scalar quantity.  Most if not all concrete situations -
- and decisions guiding conduct are never taken apart from concrete situations -- embody a 
messy amalgam of questions answered and questions evaded or suppressed.  Lonergan suggests 
that sometimes what can be done in the face of such situations will amount to little more than the 
withdrawal from the inauthenticity and authoritarianism into which we have slipped.  Most of the 
time we find ourselves in a world in which what inner law requires of us is not an all or nothing 
choice, but rather the choice to work as we can to be authentic ourselves and to encourage its 
conditions in the communities and social structures of which we are a contributing members.  In 
 44 
law, conscientious disobedience and recusal are examples of the more aggressive response that 
may be required.  Revolution is the limit case.  
 In those times before revolution and even before recusal and conscientious disobedience, 
one problem having to do with authority concerns how to keep the authorities -- that is, the 
government officials who constitute ‘the state’ -- meeting the questions of the day for the people 
of the day.  This is the problem on which most of contemporary constitutional theory of the 
‘communitarian’ or ‘civic republican’ sorts has focused, and its focus on ‘dialogue’ as the 
legitimating condition of governing has obvious parallels with my conditioning authorities’ 
authority on their meeting the questions of the day for the people of the day.
94
  The difficulties of 
solving this problem have largely prevented constitutional theorists of the sorts mentioned from 
facing that other, related problem of how such government is to create and sustain conditions in 
which non-state actors can live by the question, and, doing so, shape the actions taken by their 
authorities.     
 The problem concerns not only the overt mechanisms of ‘self-government;’ it also 
reaches its antecedent, that is, culture.  By ‘culture’ I mean the set of reasons and values we have 
for individual and collective action.  Cultures are not given by nature; they have to be created 
and re-created (or de-created), and they are to be judged valuable, like social structures, 
inasmuch as they encourage us to ask questions and proceed to live by the answers.
95 
 A state 
bureaucracy fueled by intelligent asking and answering of questions will be of little value or 
relevance to a populace inculturated into passivity, drifting, lethargy, rote rule-following.  It has 
to be question-and-answer from the bottom to top; anaesthetized subjects are ripe subjects for 
authoritarian depredations, not for authority and the law it can generate. 
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 45 
 Because living by inner law means living in community (society) -- no one meets 
questions except within a common horizon of experience, understanding, knowledge, values, and 
aims -- the state (that is, government) will have as part of its essential work the encouragement of 
communities committed to collective learning.  The vitality of such communities will depend 
more on friendship and love than on the aid of the state, but the state, too, at least much of the 
time, will have a positive responsibility to nurture such communities; indeed, the nurturing of 
such communities will be one of the reasons that justify the very creation of that part of the 
community that we refer to as ‘the state.’  The authority of such communities does not derive 
from the state; the authority of any community comes from its collective obedience to inner law, 
and the state is that part of the community of persons united in by a set of questions having to do 
with the good of the whole body politic that is authorized or empowered to give public effect to 
answers.      
 With respect to authorities acting in the name of ‘the state’ and its law, we should 
anticipate a dialectic of authority.  When, then, we observe Justice Scalia tilting too far in the 
direction of rigidity, closure, and “dogmatic democracy,” we do well recall Professor Glendon’s 
reference to “our legal culture.”
96  
Scalia’s bid for radical reform operates against a background 
of intelligentsia who deny -- through a form of judicial imperialism that falls at the other end of 
the spectrum from Scalia’s -- that values worth living by emerge through the community’s (or, 
rather, communities’) collective inquiry (or inquiries).  As we assess Scalia’s attempt to redress 
an imbalance caused by judicial legislation in derogation from the central moral tradition of the 
West, we observe a case in this point of Vining’s:  “Disputes in constitutional or administrative 
law,” Vining observes, “are almost always in part about the design of institutions that will make 
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law possible,” by making authority possible.
97 
 If we sympathize with Scalia’s attempt to create a 
closed universe of legal texts in response to a (legal) culture that would entrust judicial actors 
with power that many have grown accustomed to abuse, still we must observe that the 
unreasonable responses that unreasonable situations call forth remain, for all that, unreasonable.  
“The claim of illegality, persuasively made, is always the claim that what is, even if it has always 
been done, has no authority.”
98 
 Except for the appearance of prophet or saint who shocks people 
into new ways of aspiring and living, the transitions to be made must be one at a time, meeting 
the questions of the day for the people of the day.  
 I have emphasized the dialectic of authority, but the final word must go to what at the 
outset I described as the “rock” on which we can perform the necessary dialectic.  That rock on 
which we can build is the human subject’s dynamic orientation toward, by way of his primal and 
unrestricted desire for, the real and the good.  That rock is not a theory or a text, but it provides 
the concrete conditions under which the subject begins to move from pure interiority and come 
to know the real and the valuable and, then, to instantiate the valuable in his living.  A full 
account of our interiority lies, of course, beyond the scope of this inquiry into authority in law; 
the goal here has been to suggest, in a preliminary way, why nothing else than meeting the 
human subject’s eros for the real and the valuable – that is, inner law -- will supply the authority 
necessary to law and worthy human living.   
 Michael Novak once said, in a self-conscious revision of the tradition, that the 
unrestricted desire for the real and the valuable is our “natural law.”
99
  That unrestricted desire 
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does not compel us; God does not apply the natural law; our God-given drive for intelligence 
about the real and the valuable awaits our response: 
We are committed [to the realm of fact and value], not by knowing what it is and that it is 
worth while, but by an inability to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the 
Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure when a 
rationality identical with us demands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than 
the unconditioned and, when that is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in which we 
bow to an immanent Anagke. . . . 
The critical experience can weigh all else in the balance, only on condition that it does 
not criticize itself.  It is a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all 
else but no justification for its demanding.  It arises, fact-like, to generate knowledge of 
fact, to push the cognitional process from the conditioned structures of intelligence to 
unreserved affirmation of the unconditioned.  It occurs.
100 
  
The conquest is subtle.  History reveals the frequency with which it occurs or fails to 
occur, and its further occurrence remains a choice.  Such is the dilemma of living, including in 
law.  The legal analogue of Denzingertheologie does remain a possibility -- but only for those 
slouching into authoritarianism. 
 In conclusion, it remains to be said that it is not because our constitutive eros for the real 
and the valuable is (we think) coextensive with the entire world in which we live, and which we 
might create, that the last word goes to it; it has the final say because its scope is unrestricted.  
Our questions concern the beyond, and what is beyond what we know and do in this world is 
what promises to fulfill that unrestricted desire once and for all.  The question who “we” are is, 
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as I signaled at the outset, expansive.  Denying that the form and direction of our political life 
have anything to do with life beyond the here and the now, Justice Scalia would build a wall 
between this world and the beyond.  What this occludes is the fact that those who follow the 
question in the here and now are -- whether they recognize it or not -- on their way to what is 
surpassing; they are on the way to recognizing the true and only Sovereign.  “The question of 
God,” as Lonergan says, “lies within man’s horizon. . . .  The contemporary humanist will refuse 
to allow the question to arise.  But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native 
orientation to the divine.”
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